rebase: update kubernetes to v1.25.0

update kubernetes to latest v1.25.0
release.

Signed-off-by: Madhu Rajanna <madhupr007@gmail.com>

vendor/k8s.io/pod-security-admission/policy/check_seccompProfile_restricted.go

@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+/*
+Copyright 2021 The Kubernetes Authors.
+
+Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+You may obtain a copy of the License at
+
+    http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+
+Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+limitations under the License.
+*/
+
+package policy
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"strings"
+
+	corev1 "k8s.io/api/core/v1"
+	metav1 "k8s.io/apimachinery/pkg/apis/meta/v1"
+	"k8s.io/apimachinery/pkg/util/sets"
+	"k8s.io/pod-security-admission/api"
+)
+
+/*
+
+Seccomp profiles must be specified, and only runtime default and localhost profiles are allowed.
+
+v1.19+:
+**Restricted Fields:**
+spec.securityContext.seccompProfile.type
+spec.containers[*].securityContext.seccompProfile.type
+spec.initContainers[*].securityContext.seccompProfile.type
+
+**Allowed Values:** 'RuntimeDefault', 'Localhost'
+Note: container-level fields may be undefined if pod-level field is specified.
+
+*/
+
+func init() {
+	addCheck(CheckSeccompProfileRestricted)
+}
+
+func CheckSeccompProfileRestricted() Check {
+	return Check{
+		ID:    "seccompProfile_restricted",
+		Level: api.LevelRestricted,
+		Versions: []VersionedCheck{
+			{
+				MinimumVersion:   api.MajorMinorVersion(1, 19),
+				CheckPod:         seccompProfileRestricted_1_19,
+				OverrideCheckIDs: []CheckID{checkSeccompBaselineID},
+			},
+			// Starting 1.25, windows pods would be exempted from this check using pod.spec.os field when set to windows.
+			{
+				MinimumVersion:   api.MajorMinorVersion(1, 25),
+				CheckPod:         seccompProfileRestricted_1_25,
+				OverrideCheckIDs: []CheckID{checkSeccompBaselineID},
+			},
+		},
+	}
+}
+
+// seccompProfileRestricted_1_19 checks restricted policy on securityContext.seccompProfile field
+func seccompProfileRestricted_1_19(podMetadata *metav1.ObjectMeta, podSpec *corev1.PodSpec) CheckResult {
+	// things that explicitly set seccompProfile.type to a bad value
+	var badSetters []string
+	badValues := sets.NewString()
+
+	podSeccompSet := false
+
+	if podSpec.SecurityContext != nil && podSpec.SecurityContext.SeccompProfile != nil {
+		if !validSeccomp(podSpec.SecurityContext.SeccompProfile.Type) {
+			badSetters = append(badSetters, "pod")
+			badValues.Insert(string(podSpec.SecurityContext.SeccompProfile.Type))
+		} else {
+			podSeccompSet = true
+		}
+	}
+
+	// containers that explicitly set seccompProfile.type to a bad value
+	var explicitlyBadContainers []string
+	// containers that didn't set seccompProfile and aren't caught by a pod-level seccompProfile
+	var implicitlyBadContainers []string
+
+	visitContainers(podSpec, func(c *corev1.Container) {
+		if c.SecurityContext != nil && c.SecurityContext.SeccompProfile != nil {
+			// container explicitly set seccompProfile
+			if !validSeccomp(c.SecurityContext.SeccompProfile.Type) {
+				// container explicitly set seccompProfile to a bad value
+				explicitlyBadContainers = append(explicitlyBadContainers, c.Name)
+				badValues.Insert(string(c.SecurityContext.SeccompProfile.Type))
+			}
+		} else {
+			// container did not explicitly set seccompProfile
+			if !podSeccompSet {
+				// no valid pod-level seccompProfile, so this container implicitly has a bad value
+				implicitlyBadContainers = append(implicitlyBadContainers, c.Name)
+			}
+		}
+	})
+
+	if len(explicitlyBadContainers) > 0 {
+		badSetters = append(
+			badSetters,
+			fmt.Sprintf(
+				"%s %s",
+				pluralize("container", "containers", len(explicitlyBadContainers)),
+				joinQuote(explicitlyBadContainers),
+			),
+		)
+	}
+	// pod or containers explicitly set bad seccompProfiles
+	if len(badSetters) > 0 {
+		return CheckResult{
+			Allowed:         false,
+			ForbiddenReason: "seccompProfile",
+			ForbiddenDetail: fmt.Sprintf(
+				"%s must not set securityContext.seccompProfile.type to %s",
+				strings.Join(badSetters, " and "),
+				joinQuote(badValues.List()),
+			),
+		}
+	}
+
+	// pod didn't set seccompProfile and not all containers opted into seccompProfile
+	if len(implicitlyBadContainers) > 0 {
+		return CheckResult{
+			Allowed:         false,
+			ForbiddenReason: "seccompProfile",
+			ForbiddenDetail: fmt.Sprintf(
+				`pod or %s %s must set securityContext.seccompProfile.type to "RuntimeDefault" or "Localhost"`,
+				pluralize("container", "containers", len(implicitlyBadContainers)),
+				joinQuote(implicitlyBadContainers),
+			),
+		}
+	}
+
+	return CheckResult{Allowed: true}
+}
+
+// seccompProfileRestricted_1_25 checks restricted policy on securityContext.seccompProfile field for kubernetes
+// version 1.25 and above
+func seccompProfileRestricted_1_25(podMetadata *metav1.ObjectMeta, podSpec *corev1.PodSpec) CheckResult {
+	// Pod API validation would have failed if podOS == Windows and if secCompProfile has been set.
+	// We can admit the Windows pod even if seccompProfile has not been set.
+	if podSpec.OS != nil && podSpec.OS.Name == corev1.Windows {
+		return CheckResult{Allowed: true}
+	}
+	return seccompProfileRestricted_1_19(podMetadata, podSpec)
+}