as v1.0.0 is deprecated we need to remove the support
for it in the Next coming (v3.0.0) release. This PR
removes the support for the same.
closes#882
Signed-off-by: Madhu Rajanna <madhupr007@gmail.com>
Added maxsnapshotsonimage flag to flatten
the older rbd images on the chain to avoid
issue in krbd.The limit is in krbd since it
only allocate 1 4KiB page to handle all the
snapshot ids for an image.
The max limit is 510 as per
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/
aaa2faab4ed8e5fe0111e04d6e168c028fe2987f/drivers/block/rbd.c#L98
in cephcsi we arekeeping the default to 450 to reserve 10%
to avoid issues.
Signed-off-by: Madhu Rajanna <madhupr007@gmail.com>
added skipForceFlatten flag to skip
the image deptha and skip image flattening.
This will be very useful if the kernel is
not listed in cephcsi which supports deep
flatten fauture.
Signed-off-by: Madhu Rajanna <madhupr007@gmail.com>
added Hardlimit and Softlimit flags for cephcsi
arguments. When the Softlimit is reached cephcsi
will start a background task to flatten the rbd
image and return success and if the hardlimit
is reached it will start a background task
to flatten the rbd image and return ready
to use as false to make sure that the image
will not be used until it is flatten.
Signed-off-by: Madhu Rajanna <madhupr007@gmail.com>
--retry-interval-start:
This is initial retry interval for failures. 1 second is used by default.
Signed-off-by: Humble Chirammal <hchiramm@redhat.com>
As kubernetes CSI sidecar is exposing the
GRPC mertics we can make use of the same in
ceph-csi we dont need to expose our own.
update: #881
Signed-off-by: Madhu Rajanna <madhupr007@gmail.com>
There are currently unwanted RBAC permission
is given for ceph-csi, This PR reduces removes
such unwanted RBAC resources.
Signed-off-by: Madhu Rajanna <madhupr007@gmail.com>
- adds proposal document for PVC encryption from PR448
- adds per-volume encription by generating encryption passphrase
for each volume and storing it in a KMS
- adds HashiCorp Vault integration as a KMS for encryption passphrases
- avoids encrypting volume second time if it was already encrypted but
no file system created
- avoids unnecessary checks if volume is a mapped device when encryption
was not requested
- prevents resizing encrypted volumes (it is not currently supported)
- prevents creating snapshots from encrypted volumes to prevent attack
on encryption key (security guard until re-encryption of volumes
implemented)
Signed-off-by: Vasyl Purchel vasyl.purchel@workday.com
Signed-off-by: Andrea Baglioni andrea.baglioni@workday.comFixes#420Fixes#744
`/run/mount` need to be share between host and
csi-plugin containers for `/run/mount/utab`
this is required to ensures that the network
is not stopped prior to unmounting the network devices.
Signed-off-by: Madhu Rajanna <madhupr007@gmail.com>
On systems with SELinux enabled, non-privileged containers
can't access data of privileged containers. Since the socket
is exposed by privileged containers, all sidecars must be
privileged too. This is needed only for containers running
in daemonset as we are using bidirectional mounts in daemonset
Signed-off-by: Madhu Rajanna <madhupr007@gmail.com>
currently, we are making use of host path directory
to store the provisioner socket, as this
the socket is not needed by anyone else other than
containers inside the provisioner pod using the
empty directory to store this socket is the best option.
Signed-off-by: Madhu Rajanna <madhupr007@gmail.com>
