ceph-csi/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/server.go
Niels de Vos 48455d0b3c rebase: bump golang.org/x/crypto from 0.29.0 to 0.31.0
Bumps [golang.org/x/crypto](https://github.com/golang/crypto) from 0.29.0 to
0.31.0.
- [Commits](https://github.com/golang/crypto/compare/v0.29.0...v0.31.0)

updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: golang.org/x/crypto
  dependency-type: direct:production

Cherry-picked-from: 53d5eda020
Signed-off-by: Niels de Vos <ndevos@ibm.com>
2024-12-17 07:02:43 +00:00

910 lines
30 KiB
Go

// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package ssh
import (
"bytes"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"net"
"strings"
)
// The Permissions type holds fine-grained permissions that are
// specific to a user or a specific authentication method for a user.
// The Permissions value for a successful authentication attempt is
// available in ServerConn, so it can be used to pass information from
// the user-authentication phase to the application layer.
type Permissions struct {
// CriticalOptions indicate restrictions to the default
// permissions, and are typically used in conjunction with
// user certificates. The standard for SSH certificates
// defines "force-command" (only allow the given command to
// execute) and "source-address" (only allow connections from
// the given address). The SSH package currently only enforces
// the "source-address" critical option. It is up to server
// implementations to enforce other critical options, such as
// "force-command", by checking them after the SSH handshake
// is successful. In general, SSH servers should reject
// connections that specify critical options that are unknown
// or not supported.
CriticalOptions map[string]string
// Extensions are extra functionality that the server may
// offer on authenticated connections. Lack of support for an
// extension does not preclude authenticating a user. Common
// extensions are "permit-agent-forwarding",
// "permit-X11-forwarding". The Go SSH library currently does
// not act on any extension, and it is up to server
// implementations to honor them. Extensions can be used to
// pass data from the authentication callbacks to the server
// application layer.
Extensions map[string]string
}
type GSSAPIWithMICConfig struct {
// AllowLogin, must be set, is called when gssapi-with-mic
// authentication is selected (RFC 4462 section 3). The srcName is from the
// results of the GSS-API authentication. The format is username@DOMAIN.
// GSSAPI just guarantees to the server who the user is, but not if they can log in, and with what permissions.
// This callback is called after the user identity is established with GSSAPI to decide if the user can login with
// which permissions. If the user is allowed to login, it should return a nil error.
AllowLogin func(conn ConnMetadata, srcName string) (*Permissions, error)
// Server must be set. It's the implementation
// of the GSSAPIServer interface. See GSSAPIServer interface for details.
Server GSSAPIServer
}
// ServerConfig holds server specific configuration data.
type ServerConfig struct {
// Config contains configuration shared between client and server.
Config
// PublicKeyAuthAlgorithms specifies the supported client public key
// authentication algorithms. Note that this should not include certificate
// types since those use the underlying algorithm. This list is sent to the
// client if it supports the server-sig-algs extension. Order is irrelevant.
// If unspecified then a default set of algorithms is used.
PublicKeyAuthAlgorithms []string
hostKeys []Signer
// NoClientAuth is true if clients are allowed to connect without
// authenticating.
// To determine NoClientAuth at runtime, set NoClientAuth to true
// and the optional NoClientAuthCallback to a non-nil value.
NoClientAuth bool
// NoClientAuthCallback, if non-nil, is called when a user
// attempts to authenticate with auth method "none".
// NoClientAuth must also be set to true for this be used, or
// this func is unused.
NoClientAuthCallback func(ConnMetadata) (*Permissions, error)
// MaxAuthTries specifies the maximum number of authentication attempts
// permitted per connection. If set to a negative number, the number of
// attempts are unlimited. If set to zero, the number of attempts are limited
// to 6.
MaxAuthTries int
// PasswordCallback, if non-nil, is called when a user
// attempts to authenticate using a password.
PasswordCallback func(conn ConnMetadata, password []byte) (*Permissions, error)
// PublicKeyCallback, if non-nil, is called when a client
// offers a public key for authentication. It must return a nil error
// if the given public key can be used to authenticate the
// given user. For example, see CertChecker.Authenticate. A
// call to this function does not guarantee that the key
// offered is in fact used to authenticate. To record any data
// depending on the public key, store it inside a
// Permissions.Extensions entry.
PublicKeyCallback func(conn ConnMetadata, key PublicKey) (*Permissions, error)
// KeyboardInteractiveCallback, if non-nil, is called when
// keyboard-interactive authentication is selected (RFC
// 4256). The client object's Challenge function should be
// used to query the user. The callback may offer multiple
// Challenge rounds. To avoid information leaks, the client
// should be presented a challenge even if the user is
// unknown.
KeyboardInteractiveCallback func(conn ConnMetadata, client KeyboardInteractiveChallenge) (*Permissions, error)
// AuthLogCallback, if non-nil, is called to log all authentication
// attempts.
AuthLogCallback func(conn ConnMetadata, method string, err error)
// ServerVersion is the version identification string to announce in
// the public handshake.
// If empty, a reasonable default is used.
// Note that RFC 4253 section 4.2 requires that this string start with
// "SSH-2.0-".
ServerVersion string
// BannerCallback, if present, is called and the return string is sent to
// the client after key exchange completed but before authentication.
BannerCallback func(conn ConnMetadata) string
// GSSAPIWithMICConfig includes gssapi server and callback, which if both non-nil, is used
// when gssapi-with-mic authentication is selected (RFC 4462 section 3).
GSSAPIWithMICConfig *GSSAPIWithMICConfig
}
// AddHostKey adds a private key as a host key. If an existing host
// key exists with the same public key format, it is replaced. Each server
// config must have at least one host key.
func (s *ServerConfig) AddHostKey(key Signer) {
for i, k := range s.hostKeys {
if k.PublicKey().Type() == key.PublicKey().Type() {
s.hostKeys[i] = key
return
}
}
s.hostKeys = append(s.hostKeys, key)
}
// cachedPubKey contains the results of querying whether a public key is
// acceptable for a user. This is a FIFO cache.
type cachedPubKey struct {
user string
pubKeyData []byte
result error
perms *Permissions
}
// maxCachedPubKeys is the number of cache entries we store.
//
// Due to consistent misuse of the PublicKeyCallback API, we have reduced this
// to 1, such that the only key in the cache is the most recently seen one. This
// forces the behavior that the last call to PublicKeyCallback will always be
// with the key that is used for authentication.
const maxCachedPubKeys = 1
// pubKeyCache caches tests for public keys. Since SSH clients
// will query whether a public key is acceptable before attempting to
// authenticate with it, we end up with duplicate queries for public
// key validity. The cache only applies to a single ServerConn.
type pubKeyCache struct {
keys []cachedPubKey
}
// get returns the result for a given user/algo/key tuple.
func (c *pubKeyCache) get(user string, pubKeyData []byte) (cachedPubKey, bool) {
for _, k := range c.keys {
if k.user == user && bytes.Equal(k.pubKeyData, pubKeyData) {
return k, true
}
}
return cachedPubKey{}, false
}
// add adds the given tuple to the cache.
func (c *pubKeyCache) add(candidate cachedPubKey) {
if len(c.keys) >= maxCachedPubKeys {
c.keys = c.keys[1:]
}
c.keys = append(c.keys, candidate)
}
// ServerConn is an authenticated SSH connection, as seen from the
// server
type ServerConn struct {
Conn
// If the succeeding authentication callback returned a
// non-nil Permissions pointer, it is stored here.
Permissions *Permissions
}
// NewServerConn starts a new SSH server with c as the underlying
// transport. It starts with a handshake and, if the handshake is
// unsuccessful, it closes the connection and returns an error. The
// Request and NewChannel channels must be serviced, or the connection
// will hang.
//
// The returned error may be of type *ServerAuthError for
// authentication errors.
func NewServerConn(c net.Conn, config *ServerConfig) (*ServerConn, <-chan NewChannel, <-chan *Request, error) {
fullConf := *config
fullConf.SetDefaults()
if fullConf.MaxAuthTries == 0 {
fullConf.MaxAuthTries = 6
}
if len(fullConf.PublicKeyAuthAlgorithms) == 0 {
fullConf.PublicKeyAuthAlgorithms = supportedPubKeyAuthAlgos
} else {
for _, algo := range fullConf.PublicKeyAuthAlgorithms {
if !contains(supportedPubKeyAuthAlgos, algo) {
c.Close()
return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported public key authentication algorithm %s", algo)
}
}
}
// Check if the config contains any unsupported key exchanges
for _, kex := range fullConf.KeyExchanges {
if _, ok := serverForbiddenKexAlgos[kex]; ok {
c.Close()
return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported key exchange %s for server", kex)
}
}
s := &connection{
sshConn: sshConn{conn: c},
}
perms, err := s.serverHandshake(&fullConf)
if err != nil {
c.Close()
return nil, nil, nil, err
}
return &ServerConn{s, perms}, s.mux.incomingChannels, s.mux.incomingRequests, nil
}
// signAndMarshal signs the data with the appropriate algorithm,
// and serializes the result in SSH wire format. algo is the negotiate
// algorithm and may be a certificate type.
func signAndMarshal(k AlgorithmSigner, rand io.Reader, data []byte, algo string) ([]byte, error) {
sig, err := k.SignWithAlgorithm(rand, data, underlyingAlgo(algo))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return Marshal(sig), nil
}
// handshake performs key exchange and user authentication.
func (s *connection) serverHandshake(config *ServerConfig) (*Permissions, error) {
if len(config.hostKeys) == 0 {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: server has no host keys")
}
if !config.NoClientAuth && config.PasswordCallback == nil && config.PublicKeyCallback == nil &&
config.KeyboardInteractiveCallback == nil && (config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig == nil ||
config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig.AllowLogin == nil || config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig.Server == nil) {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: no authentication methods configured but NoClientAuth is also false")
}
if config.ServerVersion != "" {
s.serverVersion = []byte(config.ServerVersion)
} else {
s.serverVersion = []byte(packageVersion)
}
var err error
s.clientVersion, err = exchangeVersions(s.sshConn.conn, s.serverVersion)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
tr := newTransport(s.sshConn.conn, config.Rand, false /* not client */)
s.transport = newServerTransport(tr, s.clientVersion, s.serverVersion, config)
if err := s.transport.waitSession(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// We just did the key change, so the session ID is established.
s.sessionID = s.transport.getSessionID()
var packet []byte
if packet, err = s.transport.readPacket(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var serviceRequest serviceRequestMsg
if err = Unmarshal(packet, &serviceRequest); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if serviceRequest.Service != serviceUserAuth {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: requested service '" + serviceRequest.Service + "' before authenticating")
}
serviceAccept := serviceAcceptMsg{
Service: serviceUserAuth,
}
if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&serviceAccept)); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
perms, err := s.serverAuthenticate(config)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
s.mux = newMux(s.transport)
return perms, err
}
func checkSourceAddress(addr net.Addr, sourceAddrs string) error {
if addr == nil {
return errors.New("ssh: no address known for client, but source-address match required")
}
tcpAddr, ok := addr.(*net.TCPAddr)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("ssh: remote address %v is not an TCP address when checking source-address match", addr)
}
for _, sourceAddr := range strings.Split(sourceAddrs, ",") {
if allowedIP := net.ParseIP(sourceAddr); allowedIP != nil {
if allowedIP.Equal(tcpAddr.IP) {
return nil
}
} else {
_, ipNet, err := net.ParseCIDR(sourceAddr)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("ssh: error parsing source-address restriction %q: %v", sourceAddr, err)
}
if ipNet.Contains(tcpAddr.IP) {
return nil
}
}
}
return fmt.Errorf("ssh: remote address %v is not allowed because of source-address restriction", addr)
}
func gssExchangeToken(gssapiConfig *GSSAPIWithMICConfig, token []byte, s *connection,
sessionID []byte, userAuthReq userAuthRequestMsg) (authErr error, perms *Permissions, err error) {
gssAPIServer := gssapiConfig.Server
defer gssAPIServer.DeleteSecContext()
var srcName string
for {
var (
outToken []byte
needContinue bool
)
outToken, srcName, needContinue, err = gssAPIServer.AcceptSecContext(token)
if err != nil {
return err, nil, nil
}
if len(outToken) != 0 {
if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&userAuthGSSAPIToken{
Token: outToken,
})); err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
}
if !needContinue {
break
}
packet, err := s.transport.readPacket()
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
userAuthGSSAPITokenReq := &userAuthGSSAPIToken{}
if err := Unmarshal(packet, userAuthGSSAPITokenReq); err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
token = userAuthGSSAPITokenReq.Token
}
packet, err := s.transport.readPacket()
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
userAuthGSSAPIMICReq := &userAuthGSSAPIMIC{}
if err := Unmarshal(packet, userAuthGSSAPIMICReq); err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
mic := buildMIC(string(sessionID), userAuthReq.User, userAuthReq.Service, userAuthReq.Method)
if err := gssAPIServer.VerifyMIC(mic, userAuthGSSAPIMICReq.MIC); err != nil {
return err, nil, nil
}
perms, authErr = gssapiConfig.AllowLogin(s, srcName)
return authErr, perms, nil
}
// isAlgoCompatible checks if the signature format is compatible with the
// selected algorithm taking into account edge cases that occur with old
// clients.
func isAlgoCompatible(algo, sigFormat string) bool {
// Compatibility for old clients.
//
// For certificate authentication with OpenSSH 7.2-7.7 signature format can
// be rsa-sha2-256 or rsa-sha2-512 for the algorithm
// ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com.
//
// With gpg-agent < 2.2.6 the algorithm can be rsa-sha2-256 or rsa-sha2-512
// for signature format ssh-rsa.
if isRSA(algo) && isRSA(sigFormat) {
return true
}
// Standard case: the underlying algorithm must match the signature format.
return underlyingAlgo(algo) == sigFormat
}
// ServerAuthError represents server authentication errors and is
// sometimes returned by NewServerConn. It appends any authentication
// errors that may occur, and is returned if all of the authentication
// methods provided by the user failed to authenticate.
type ServerAuthError struct {
// Errors contains authentication errors returned by the authentication
// callback methods. The first entry is typically ErrNoAuth.
Errors []error
}
func (l ServerAuthError) Error() string {
var errs []string
for _, err := range l.Errors {
errs = append(errs, err.Error())
}
return "[" + strings.Join(errs, ", ") + "]"
}
// ServerAuthCallbacks defines server-side authentication callbacks.
type ServerAuthCallbacks struct {
// PasswordCallback behaves like [ServerConfig.PasswordCallback].
PasswordCallback func(conn ConnMetadata, password []byte) (*Permissions, error)
// PublicKeyCallback behaves like [ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback].
PublicKeyCallback func(conn ConnMetadata, key PublicKey) (*Permissions, error)
// KeyboardInteractiveCallback behaves like [ServerConfig.KeyboardInteractiveCallback].
KeyboardInteractiveCallback func(conn ConnMetadata, client KeyboardInteractiveChallenge) (*Permissions, error)
// GSSAPIWithMICConfig behaves like [ServerConfig.GSSAPIWithMICConfig].
GSSAPIWithMICConfig *GSSAPIWithMICConfig
}
// PartialSuccessError can be returned by any of the [ServerConfig]
// authentication callbacks to indicate to the client that authentication has
// partially succeeded, but further steps are required.
type PartialSuccessError struct {
// Next defines the authentication callbacks to apply to further steps. The
// available methods communicated to the client are based on the non-nil
// ServerAuthCallbacks fields.
Next ServerAuthCallbacks
}
func (p *PartialSuccessError) Error() string {
return "ssh: authenticated with partial success"
}
// ErrNoAuth is the error value returned if no
// authentication method has been passed yet. This happens as a normal
// part of the authentication loop, since the client first tries
// 'none' authentication to discover available methods.
// It is returned in ServerAuthError.Errors from NewServerConn.
var ErrNoAuth = errors.New("ssh: no auth passed yet")
// BannerError is an error that can be returned by authentication handlers in
// ServerConfig to send a banner message to the client.
type BannerError struct {
Err error
Message string
}
func (b *BannerError) Unwrap() error {
return b.Err
}
func (b *BannerError) Error() string {
if b.Err == nil {
return b.Message
}
return b.Err.Error()
}
func (s *connection) serverAuthenticate(config *ServerConfig) (*Permissions, error) {
sessionID := s.transport.getSessionID()
var cache pubKeyCache
var perms *Permissions
authFailures := 0
noneAuthCount := 0
var authErrs []error
var displayedBanner bool
partialSuccessReturned := false
// Set the initial authentication callbacks from the config. They can be
// changed if a PartialSuccessError is returned.
authConfig := ServerAuthCallbacks{
PasswordCallback: config.PasswordCallback,
PublicKeyCallback: config.PublicKeyCallback,
KeyboardInteractiveCallback: config.KeyboardInteractiveCallback,
GSSAPIWithMICConfig: config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig,
}
userAuthLoop:
for {
if authFailures >= config.MaxAuthTries && config.MaxAuthTries > 0 {
discMsg := &disconnectMsg{
Reason: 2,
Message: "too many authentication failures",
}
if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(discMsg)); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
authErrs = append(authErrs, discMsg)
return nil, &ServerAuthError{Errors: authErrs}
}
var userAuthReq userAuthRequestMsg
if packet, err := s.transport.readPacket(); err != nil {
if err == io.EOF {
return nil, &ServerAuthError{Errors: authErrs}
}
return nil, err
} else if err = Unmarshal(packet, &userAuthReq); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if userAuthReq.Service != serviceSSH {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: client attempted to negotiate for unknown service: " + userAuthReq.Service)
}
if s.user != userAuthReq.User && partialSuccessReturned {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: client changed the user after a partial success authentication, previous user %q, current user %q",
s.user, userAuthReq.User)
}
s.user = userAuthReq.User
if !displayedBanner && config.BannerCallback != nil {
displayedBanner = true
msg := config.BannerCallback(s)
if msg != "" {
bannerMsg := &userAuthBannerMsg{
Message: msg,
}
if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(bannerMsg)); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
}
perms = nil
authErr := ErrNoAuth
switch userAuthReq.Method {
case "none":
noneAuthCount++
// We don't allow none authentication after a partial success
// response.
if config.NoClientAuth && !partialSuccessReturned {
if config.NoClientAuthCallback != nil {
perms, authErr = config.NoClientAuthCallback(s)
} else {
authErr = nil
}
}
case "password":
if authConfig.PasswordCallback == nil {
authErr = errors.New("ssh: password auth not configured")
break
}
payload := userAuthReq.Payload
if len(payload) < 1 || payload[0] != 0 {
return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest)
}
payload = payload[1:]
password, payload, ok := parseString(payload)
if !ok || len(payload) > 0 {
return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest)
}
perms, authErr = authConfig.PasswordCallback(s, password)
case "keyboard-interactive":
if authConfig.KeyboardInteractiveCallback == nil {
authErr = errors.New("ssh: keyboard-interactive auth not configured")
break
}
prompter := &sshClientKeyboardInteractive{s}
perms, authErr = authConfig.KeyboardInteractiveCallback(s, prompter.Challenge)
case "publickey":
if authConfig.PublicKeyCallback == nil {
authErr = errors.New("ssh: publickey auth not configured")
break
}
payload := userAuthReq.Payload
if len(payload) < 1 {
return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest)
}
isQuery := payload[0] == 0
payload = payload[1:]
algoBytes, payload, ok := parseString(payload)
if !ok {
return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest)
}
algo := string(algoBytes)
if !contains(config.PublicKeyAuthAlgorithms, underlyingAlgo(algo)) {
authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: algorithm %q not accepted", algo)
break
}
pubKeyData, payload, ok := parseString(payload)
if !ok {
return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest)
}
pubKey, err := ParsePublicKey(pubKeyData)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
candidate, ok := cache.get(s.user, pubKeyData)
if !ok {
candidate.user = s.user
candidate.pubKeyData = pubKeyData
candidate.perms, candidate.result = authConfig.PublicKeyCallback(s, pubKey)
_, isPartialSuccessError := candidate.result.(*PartialSuccessError)
if (candidate.result == nil || isPartialSuccessError) &&
candidate.perms != nil &&
candidate.perms.CriticalOptions != nil &&
candidate.perms.CriticalOptions[sourceAddressCriticalOption] != "" {
if err := checkSourceAddress(
s.RemoteAddr(),
candidate.perms.CriticalOptions[sourceAddressCriticalOption]); err != nil {
candidate.result = err
}
}
cache.add(candidate)
}
if isQuery {
// The client can query if the given public key
// would be okay.
if len(payload) > 0 {
return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest)
}
_, isPartialSuccessError := candidate.result.(*PartialSuccessError)
if candidate.result == nil || isPartialSuccessError {
okMsg := userAuthPubKeyOkMsg{
Algo: algo,
PubKey: pubKeyData,
}
if err = s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&okMsg)); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
continue userAuthLoop
}
authErr = candidate.result
} else {
sig, payload, ok := parseSignature(payload)
if !ok || len(payload) > 0 {
return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest)
}
// Ensure the declared public key algo is compatible with the
// decoded one. This check will ensure we don't accept e.g.
// ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com algorithm with ssh-rsa public
// key type. The algorithm and public key type must be
// consistent: both must be certificate algorithms, or neither.
if !contains(algorithmsForKeyFormat(pubKey.Type()), algo) {
authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: public key type %q not compatible with selected algorithm %q",
pubKey.Type(), algo)
break
}
// Ensure the public key algo and signature algo
// are supported. Compare the private key
// algorithm name that corresponds to algo with
// sig.Format. This is usually the same, but
// for certs, the names differ.
if !contains(config.PublicKeyAuthAlgorithms, sig.Format) {
authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: algorithm %q not accepted", sig.Format)
break
}
if !isAlgoCompatible(algo, sig.Format) {
authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: signature %q not compatible with selected algorithm %q", sig.Format, algo)
break
}
signedData := buildDataSignedForAuth(sessionID, userAuthReq, algo, pubKeyData)
if err := pubKey.Verify(signedData, sig); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
authErr = candidate.result
perms = candidate.perms
}
case "gssapi-with-mic":
if authConfig.GSSAPIWithMICConfig == nil {
authErr = errors.New("ssh: gssapi-with-mic auth not configured")
break
}
gssapiConfig := authConfig.GSSAPIWithMICConfig
userAuthRequestGSSAPI, err := parseGSSAPIPayload(userAuthReq.Payload)
if err != nil {
return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest)
}
// OpenSSH supports Kerberos V5 mechanism only for GSS-API authentication.
if userAuthRequestGSSAPI.N == 0 {
authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: Mechanism negotiation is not supported")
break
}
var i uint32
present := false
for i = 0; i < userAuthRequestGSSAPI.N; i++ {
if userAuthRequestGSSAPI.OIDS[i].Equal(krb5Mesh) {
present = true
break
}
}
if !present {
authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: GSSAPI authentication must use the Kerberos V5 mechanism")
break
}
// Initial server response, see RFC 4462 section 3.3.
if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&userAuthGSSAPIResponse{
SupportMech: krb5OID,
})); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Exchange token, see RFC 4462 section 3.4.
packet, err := s.transport.readPacket()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
userAuthGSSAPITokenReq := &userAuthGSSAPIToken{}
if err := Unmarshal(packet, userAuthGSSAPITokenReq); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
authErr, perms, err = gssExchangeToken(gssapiConfig, userAuthGSSAPITokenReq.Token, s, sessionID,
userAuthReq)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
default:
authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: unknown method %q", userAuthReq.Method)
}
authErrs = append(authErrs, authErr)
if config.AuthLogCallback != nil {
config.AuthLogCallback(s, userAuthReq.Method, authErr)
}
var bannerErr *BannerError
if errors.As(authErr, &bannerErr) {
if bannerErr.Message != "" {
bannerMsg := &userAuthBannerMsg{
Message: bannerErr.Message,
}
if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(bannerMsg)); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
}
if authErr == nil {
break userAuthLoop
}
var failureMsg userAuthFailureMsg
if partialSuccess, ok := authErr.(*PartialSuccessError); ok {
// After a partial success error we don't allow changing the user
// name and execute the NoClientAuthCallback.
partialSuccessReturned = true
// In case a partial success is returned, the server may send
// a new set of authentication methods.
authConfig = partialSuccess.Next
// Reset pubkey cache, as the new PublicKeyCallback might
// accept a different set of public keys.
cache = pubKeyCache{}
// Send back a partial success message to the user.
failureMsg.PartialSuccess = true
} else {
// Allow initial attempt of 'none' without penalty.
if authFailures > 0 || userAuthReq.Method != "none" || noneAuthCount != 1 {
authFailures++
}
if config.MaxAuthTries > 0 && authFailures >= config.MaxAuthTries {
// If we have hit the max attempts, don't bother sending the
// final SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE message, since there are
// no more authentication methods which can be attempted,
// and this message may cause the client to re-attempt
// authentication while we send the disconnect message.
// Continue, and trigger the disconnect at the start of
// the loop.
//
// The SSH specification is somewhat confusing about this,
// RFC 4252 Section 5.1 requires each authentication failure
// be responded to with a respective SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE
// message, but Section 4 says the server should disconnect
// after some number of attempts, but it isn't explicit which
// message should take precedence (i.e. should there be a failure
// message than a disconnect message, or if we are going to
// disconnect, should we only send that message.)
//
// Either way, OpenSSH disconnects immediately after the last
// failed authentication attempt, and given they are typically
// considered the golden implementation it seems reasonable
// to match that behavior.
continue
}
}
if authConfig.PasswordCallback != nil {
failureMsg.Methods = append(failureMsg.Methods, "password")
}
if authConfig.PublicKeyCallback != nil {
failureMsg.Methods = append(failureMsg.Methods, "publickey")
}
if authConfig.KeyboardInteractiveCallback != nil {
failureMsg.Methods = append(failureMsg.Methods, "keyboard-interactive")
}
if authConfig.GSSAPIWithMICConfig != nil && authConfig.GSSAPIWithMICConfig.Server != nil &&
authConfig.GSSAPIWithMICConfig.AllowLogin != nil {
failureMsg.Methods = append(failureMsg.Methods, "gssapi-with-mic")
}
if len(failureMsg.Methods) == 0 {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: no authentication methods available")
}
if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&failureMsg)); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
if err := s.transport.writePacket([]byte{msgUserAuthSuccess}); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return perms, nil
}
// sshClientKeyboardInteractive implements a ClientKeyboardInteractive by
// asking the client on the other side of a ServerConn.
type sshClientKeyboardInteractive struct {
*connection
}
func (c *sshClientKeyboardInteractive) Challenge(name, instruction string, questions []string, echos []bool) (answers []string, err error) {
if len(questions) != len(echos) {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: echos and questions must have equal length")
}
var prompts []byte
for i := range questions {
prompts = appendString(prompts, questions[i])
prompts = appendBool(prompts, echos[i])
}
if err := c.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&userAuthInfoRequestMsg{
Name: name,
Instruction: instruction,
NumPrompts: uint32(len(questions)),
Prompts: prompts,
})); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
packet, err := c.transport.readPacket()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if packet[0] != msgUserAuthInfoResponse {
return nil, unexpectedMessageError(msgUserAuthInfoResponse, packet[0])
}
packet = packet[1:]
n, packet, ok := parseUint32(packet)
if !ok || int(n) != len(questions) {
return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthInfoResponse)
}
for i := uint32(0); i < n; i++ {
ans, rest, ok := parseString(packet)
if !ok {
return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthInfoResponse)
}
answers = append(answers, string(ans))
packet = rest
}
if len(packet) != 0 {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: junk at end of message")
}
return answers, nil
}