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https://github.com/ceph/ceph-csi.git
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4a1927f2f3
Update K8s packages in go.mod to v0.32.0 Signed-off-by: Praveen M <m.praveen@ibm.com>
208 lines
8.2 KiB
Go
208 lines
8.2 KiB
Go
//go:build linux
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// Copyright (C) 2024 SUSE LLC. All rights reserved.
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// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
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// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
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package securejoin
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import (
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"os"
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"path/filepath"
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"slices"
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"strings"
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"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
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)
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var (
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errInvalidMode = errors.New("invalid permission mode")
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errPossibleAttack = errors.New("possible attack detected")
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)
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// MkdirAllHandle is equivalent to [MkdirAll], except that it is safer to use
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// in two respects:
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//
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// - The caller provides the root directory as an *[os.File] (preferably O_PATH)
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// handle. This means that the caller can be sure which root directory is
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// being used. Note that this can be emulated by using /proc/self/fd/... as
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// the root path with [os.MkdirAll].
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//
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// - Once all of the directories have been created, an *[os.File] O_PATH handle
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// to the directory at unsafePath is returned to the caller. This is done in
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// an effectively-race-free way (an attacker would only be able to swap the
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// final directory component), which is not possible to emulate with
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// [MkdirAll].
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//
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// In addition, the returned handle is obtained far more efficiently than doing
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// a brand new lookup of unsafePath (such as with [SecureJoin] or openat2) after
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// doing [MkdirAll]. If you intend to open the directory after creating it, you
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// should use MkdirAllHandle.
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func MkdirAllHandle(root *os.File, unsafePath string, mode int) (_ *os.File, Err error) {
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// Make sure there are no os.FileMode bits set.
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if mode&^0o7777 != 0 {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w for mkdir 0o%.3o", errInvalidMode, mode)
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}
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// On Linux, mkdirat(2) (and os.Mkdir) silently ignore the suid and sgid
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// bits. We could also silently ignore them but since we have very few
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// users it seems more prudent to return an error so users notice that
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// these bits will not be set.
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if mode&^0o1777 != 0 {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w for mkdir 0o%.3o: suid and sgid are ignored by mkdir", errInvalidMode, mode)
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}
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// Try to open as much of the path as possible.
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currentDir, remainingPath, err := partialLookupInRoot(root, unsafePath)
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defer func() {
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if Err != nil {
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_ = currentDir.Close()
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}
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}()
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if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, unix.ENOENT) {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("find existing subpath of %q: %w", unsafePath, err)
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}
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// If there is an attacker deleting directories as we walk into them,
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// detect this proactively. Note this is guaranteed to detect if the
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// attacker deleted any part of the tree up to currentDir.
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//
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// Once we walk into a dead directory, partialLookupInRoot would not be
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// able to walk further down the tree (directories must be empty before
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// they are deleted), and if the attacker has removed the entire tree we
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// can be sure that anything that was originally inside a dead directory
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// must also be deleted and thus is a dead directory in its own right.
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//
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// This is mostly a quality-of-life check, because mkdir will simply fail
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// later if the attacker deletes the tree after this check.
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if err := isDeadInode(currentDir); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("finding existing subpath of %q: %w", unsafePath, err)
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}
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// Re-open the path to match the O_DIRECTORY reopen loop later (so that we
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// always return a non-O_PATH handle). We also check that we actually got a
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// directory.
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if reopenDir, err := Reopen(currentDir, unix.O_DIRECTORY|unix.O_CLOEXEC); errors.Is(err, unix.ENOTDIR) {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot create subdirectories in %q: %w", currentDir.Name(), unix.ENOTDIR)
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} else if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("re-opening handle to %q: %w", currentDir.Name(), err)
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} else {
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_ = currentDir.Close()
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currentDir = reopenDir
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}
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remainingParts := strings.Split(remainingPath, string(filepath.Separator))
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if slices.Contains(remainingParts, "..") {
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// The path contained ".." components after the end of the "real"
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// components. We could try to safely resolve ".." here but that would
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// add a bunch of extra logic for something that it's not clear even
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// needs to be supported. So just return an error.
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//
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// If we do filepath.Clean(remainingPath) then we end up with the
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// problem that ".." can erase a trailing dangling symlink and produce
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// a path that doesn't quite match what the user asked for.
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: yet-to-be-created path %q contains '..' components", unix.ENOENT, remainingPath)
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}
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// Make sure the mode doesn't have any type bits.
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mode &^= unix.S_IFMT
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// Create the remaining components.
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for _, part := range remainingParts {
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switch part {
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case "", ".":
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// Skip over no-op paths.
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continue
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}
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// NOTE: mkdir(2) will not follow trailing symlinks, so we can safely
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// create the final component without worrying about symlink-exchange
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// attacks.
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if err := unix.Mkdirat(int(currentDir.Fd()), part, uint32(mode)); err != nil {
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err = &os.PathError{Op: "mkdirat", Path: currentDir.Name() + "/" + part, Err: err}
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// Make the error a bit nicer if the directory is dead.
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if err2 := isDeadInode(currentDir); err2 != nil {
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err = fmt.Errorf("%w (%w)", err, err2)
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}
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return nil, err
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}
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// Get a handle to the next component. O_DIRECTORY means we don't need
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// to use O_PATH.
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var nextDir *os.File
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if hasOpenat2() {
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nextDir, err = openat2File(currentDir, part, &unix.OpenHow{
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Flags: unix.O_NOFOLLOW | unix.O_DIRECTORY | unix.O_CLOEXEC,
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Resolve: unix.RESOLVE_BENEATH | unix.RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS | unix.RESOLVE_NO_XDEV,
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})
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} else {
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nextDir, err = openatFile(currentDir, part, unix.O_NOFOLLOW|unix.O_DIRECTORY|unix.O_CLOEXEC, 0)
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}
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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_ = currentDir.Close()
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currentDir = nextDir
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// It's possible that the directory we just opened was swapped by an
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// attacker. Unfortunately there isn't much we can do to protect
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// against this, and MkdirAll's behaviour is that we will reuse
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// existing directories anyway so the need to protect against this is
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// incredibly limited (and arguably doesn't even deserve mention here).
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//
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// Ideally we might want to check that the owner and mode match what we
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// would've created -- unfortunately, it is non-trivial to verify that
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// the owner and mode of the created directory match. While plain Unix
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// DAC rules seem simple enough to emulate, there are a bunch of other
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// factors that can change the mode or owner of created directories
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// (default POSIX ACLs, mount options like uid=1,gid=2,umask=0 on
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// filesystems like vfat, etc etc). We used to try to verify this but
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// it just lead to a series of spurious errors.
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//
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// We could also check that the directory is non-empty, but
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// unfortunately some pseduofilesystems (like cgroupfs) create
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// non-empty directories, which would result in different spurious
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// errors.
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}
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return currentDir, nil
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}
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// MkdirAll is a race-safe alternative to the [os.MkdirAll] function,
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// where the new directory is guaranteed to be within the root directory (if an
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// attacker can move directories from inside the root to outside the root, the
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// created directory tree might be outside of the root but the key constraint
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// is that at no point will we walk outside of the directory tree we are
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// creating).
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//
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// Effectively, MkdirAll(root, unsafePath, mode) is equivalent to
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//
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// path, _ := securejoin.SecureJoin(root, unsafePath)
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// err := os.MkdirAll(path, mode)
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//
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// But is much safer. The above implementation is unsafe because if an attacker
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// can modify the filesystem tree between [SecureJoin] and [os.MkdirAll], it is
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// possible for MkdirAll to resolve unsafe symlink components and create
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// directories outside of the root.
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//
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// If you plan to open the directory after you have created it or want to use
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// an open directory handle as the root, you should use [MkdirAllHandle] instead.
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// This function is a wrapper around [MkdirAllHandle].
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//
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// NOTE: The mode argument must be set the unix mode bits (unix.S_I...), not
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// the Go generic mode bits ([os.FileMode]...).
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func MkdirAll(root, unsafePath string, mode int) error {
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rootDir, err := os.OpenFile(root, unix.O_PATH|unix.O_DIRECTORY|unix.O_CLOEXEC, 0)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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defer rootDir.Close()
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f, err := MkdirAllHandle(rootDir, unsafePath, mode)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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_ = f.Close()
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return nil
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}
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