ceph-csi/e2e/vendor/k8s.io/pod-security-admission/policy/check_allowPrivilegeEscalation.go
Niels de Vos f87d06ed85 build: move e2e dependencies into e2e/go.mod
Several packages are only used while running the e2e suite. These
packages are less important to update, as the they can not influence the
final executable that is part of the Ceph-CSI container-image.

By moving these dependencies out of the main Ceph-CSI go.mod, it is
easier to identify if a reported CVE affects Ceph-CSI, or only the
testing (like most of the Kubernetes CVEs).

Signed-off-by: Niels de Vos <ndevos@ibm.com>
2025-03-04 17:43:49 +01:00

94 lines
3.0 KiB
Go

/*
Copyright 2021 The Kubernetes Authors.
Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
You may obtain a copy of the License at
http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
limitations under the License.
*/
package policy
import (
"fmt"
corev1 "k8s.io/api/core/v1"
metav1 "k8s.io/apimachinery/pkg/apis/meta/v1"
"k8s.io/pod-security-admission/api"
)
/*
Privilege escalation (such as via set-user-ID or set-group-ID file mode) should not be allowed.
**Restricted Fields:**
spec.containers[*].securityContext.allowPrivilegeEscalation
spec.initContainers[*].securityContext.allowPrivilegeEscalation
**Allowed Values:** false
*/
func init() {
addCheck(CheckAllowPrivilegeEscalation)
}
// CheckAllowPrivilegeEscalation returns a restricted level check
// that requires allowPrivilegeEscalation=false in 1.8+
func CheckAllowPrivilegeEscalation() Check {
return Check{
ID: "allowPrivilegeEscalation",
Level: api.LevelRestricted,
Versions: []VersionedCheck{
{
// Field added in 1.8:
// https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/blob/v1.8.0/staging/src/k8s.io/api/core/v1/types.go#L4797-L4804
MinimumVersion: api.MajorMinorVersion(1, 8),
CheckPod: allowPrivilegeEscalation_1_8,
},
{
// Starting 1.25, windows pods would be exempted from this check using pod.spec.os field when set to windows.
MinimumVersion: api.MajorMinorVersion(1, 25),
CheckPod: allowPrivilegeEscalation_1_25,
},
},
}
}
func allowPrivilegeEscalation_1_8(podMetadata *metav1.ObjectMeta, podSpec *corev1.PodSpec) CheckResult {
var badContainers []string
visitContainers(podSpec, func(container *corev1.Container) {
if container.SecurityContext == nil || container.SecurityContext.AllowPrivilegeEscalation == nil || *container.SecurityContext.AllowPrivilegeEscalation {
badContainers = append(badContainers, container.Name)
}
})
if len(badContainers) > 0 {
return CheckResult{
Allowed: false,
ForbiddenReason: "allowPrivilegeEscalation != false",
ForbiddenDetail: fmt.Sprintf(
"%s %s must set securityContext.allowPrivilegeEscalation=false",
pluralize("container", "containers", len(badContainers)),
joinQuote(badContainers),
),
}
}
return CheckResult{Allowed: true}
}
func allowPrivilegeEscalation_1_25(podMetadata *metav1.ObjectMeta, podSpec *corev1.PodSpec) CheckResult {
// Pod API validation would have failed if podOS == Windows and if privilegeEscalation has been set.
// We can admit the Windows pod even if privilegeEscalation has not been set.
if podSpec.OS != nil && podSpec.OS.Name == corev1.Windows {
return CheckResult{Allowed: true}
}
return allowPrivilegeEscalation_1_8(podMetadata, podSpec)
}